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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah

GEORGE H. STEVENS, et al,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

vs.
RALPH C. MEMMOIT, et al,
Defendants and Respondents.

~
\

CASE
NO. 8700

I
I

Brief of Plaintiffs and Appellants
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In studying this brief, plaintiffs respectfully request
the Oourt to refer constantly to Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 11,
and Defendants' Exhibit No. 10, which are illustrations
of the numerous claims in issue which will enable the COurt
to visualize the issues invo!Lved.
Plaintiffs commenced this action to quiet title to certain placer mining claims located about 8 miles west of
Fillmore, Utah, whose principal value is that of volcanic
ash and cinders wruoh is primarily used to make building
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QlOCks, poultry liter, and insulation. The plaintiffs brought
em action to quiet title to these certain :minmg claims which
are in direct conflict with those claimed by the defendan-ts.
Plaintiffs' appeal from the judgment of the lower court as
to their placer mining claims known as Drake 1, Drake 8,
Red Robin, and Red Robin A claims which, respectively,
are in direct conflict with the defendants' claims known as
Cinder Crater 14, Cinder Crater 13, and Red Hill No.1.
Prior to the location of the above claims by either party
herein, certain mining claims known as Black Dragon Nos.
4, 5 and 6 were validly located on the same grotmd at issue.
These claims were all located October 27 and 28, · 1937
(Defendants' Exhibit 58). Plaintiff Von Utley was present at the time these claims were located; he performed
some of the work in building the discovery monuments
and the corner monuments to locate said claims. At the
request of one of these original locators, to-wit, Vern Smith,
Mr. Utley placed the location notice of Black Dragon No.
5 in the discovery monument after Mr. Utley witnessed
Mr. Smith fill said location notice out, at the direction of
Mr. Smith (Tr. 133). The notice of location for Black
Dragon No. 5 is that of a metes and bounds description
commencing at the discovery monument (Defendants' Exh~bit 58, page 5). The annual assessment work was performed on the Black Dragon Claims Nos. 1-6 each year 1n
and including June 30, 1942 (Defendants' Exhibit 58).
That subsequent to June 30, 1942, to and including June
30, 1947, the original locators and their successors in interest filed Notices of Intention to Hold instead of performing the annual labor on Black Dragon Claims 1 through
5 in accordance with the Congressional Act authorizing the
suspension of annual labor on mining claims during the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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war. The Congressional Act is thart: of H. R. 2370 Bill approved May 3, 1943 (Defendants' Exhibit 58). The last
Notice of Intention to Hold ~iled for Black Dragon 6 was
for the assessment year July 1, 1941, to July 1, 1942.
Defendants located their Cinder Crater Claims as follows:
Cinder Crater 5, March 5, 1947 (Answer and Counterclaim)
Cinder Crater 13, July 28, 1947 (Defendants' No. 3)
Cinder Crater 14, July 28, 1947 (Defendants' No. 2)

AT THE TIME OF THE LOCATION OF CINDER
CRATER NOS. 5, 13, AND 14, THE BLACK DRAGON

CLAIMS 1 THROUGH 5 WERE VALID MINING CLAIMS
IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT, AND DEFENDANTS
CLAIM CINDER CRATER NO. 14 WAS NOT A VALID
LOCATION IN TH~T THERE WAS AN EXISTING
VALID MINING CLAIM ON THE SAME GROUND.
The following is a chart summarizing the mining claims
in di:root conflict of the respective parties herein and the
times of their location in order of the date of their location:
Black Dragon No. 4-Located 10-27-37 by Plaintiffs' predecessor in title, annual notices filed until 7-1-48.
Defendants' Oinder Crater No. 5----Located 3-5-47.
Plaintiffs' Red Rolbin-Looa.ted 6-22-50 and Red Robin A
located 1-22-53.
Defendants' Red Hill No. 1-Looa!ted 9-27-56-after suit
commenced.
Black Dragon No. 5----Located 10-28-37-Annual notires
filed until 7-1-48.
Defendants' Cinder Cmter No. 14-Located 7-28-47.
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Plaintiffs' Drake No. 1-Locat.ed 7-8-52, and Plaintiffs'
Drake No. 8, loca.rted 7-14-55.
Black Dragon No. 6--Located 10-29-37.
Amended 6-29-39, and increased in size to include B1ack
Dragon No. 5.
Annual Notices filed until 7-1-42.
Defendants' Cinder Crater No. 14-Located 7-28-47.
Plaintiffs' Drake No. 1-I...ocated 7-8-52.
Plaintiffs' D·rake No. 8-Located 7-14-55.
During the course of the pre-trials of 1Jhis case, it was
conceded by defendants that their claim Cinder Crater No.
5 was not a valid claim for the reason that they located
their claim at a time when Black Dragon No. 4 was a valid
mining claim in force and effect upon the same gi'OlD1d.
With full klnowledge of plaintiffs' claim to this ground and
after suit was commenced, defendants top filed defendants'
Red Robin and Red Robin A claims with their claim Red

Hill No. 1 on 9-7-56 (Defendants' Exhibit No. 10).
Prior to the location of Red Hill No. 1 by defendants,
plaintiffs had been mining the same ground, their claim
knmm as Red Robin A (Tr. 111) (Tr. 214, 215).

The uncontradicted evidence discloses that plaintiff
Von Utley was present at the time the old mining claim
Black Dragon No. 5 was located and assisted in its location; that he knows the exact location of said claim which
is described by metes and bounds description (Tr. 133);
that Mr. Utley used the same monuments as the old Black
Dragon No. 5 in locating his claim Drake No. 1 (Tr. 174,
175). Mr. Shelton, a mining engineer and licensed surveyor,
discovered the original Notice of Location of the Black
Dragon No. 5 in a monumenrt located on the Plaintiffs' claim
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Drake No. 1 and No. 8 (Tr. 90). That the mining claim
Black Dragon No.5 was in force and effect at the time defendants located their Cinder Crater No. 14 (Defendants'
E)Ch.ibit 58); that Black Dragon No. 6 was in force and effect at the time defendants' Cinder Crater No. 14 was located, whioh invalidated defendants' location of Cinder Crater No. 14 and left the ground open for plaintiffs to locate
their Drake No. 1 and Drake No. 8 upon the same ground
(Derfendanrts' Exhibit 58, Defendants' Exhibit 11, Plaintiffs'
Exhibit 10). The jury found that the defendant had constructed a road for his assessment work for the year ending July 1, 1952 and July 1, 1953, as illustrated by a red
pencil line on Defendants' Exhibit 11, between the letters
B and C on said exhibit (Tr. 288). That it required 11/2
days work to construct the road between the letters B and
C as illustrated on Defendants' Exhibit 11 (Tr. 290). The
area in which defendants claim the road was built near the
south boundary orf their Cinder Crater 13 was an area in
which defendants had no valid claim whatsoever; that it
belonged to a third party, and the Distriot Court for Millard
County rules that defendants did not have title to the area
in which the road was built >and never had title to said
ground (Tr. 263). Assuming that defendants did build this
road, which plaintiffs claim is fictitious and physically impossible to build in the area it was testified to have been
built, and in tJhe manner it was said to have been built, the
derfendanrts did build the alleged road on someone else's
claims, for which they may not claim credit as assessment
work on their own claims. The jury found that this road,
which is alleged to have been built in 1 Y2 days by defendant
was valued at $112.00 (Special Interrogatories). That a
portion of the alleged road was builrt upon defendants' Cin-
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der Crater 14, which would make defendants' assessment
work for Cinder Crater 14 for the assessment year ending
July 1, 1949, and determines whether or not Cinder Crater
13 was valid or not at the time Red Robin claim of plaintiffS
was located by plaffitiffs. It is apparent that $112.00 worth
of assessment work is not sufficient work for three claims
that defendants claim, when the said claims are not contiguous. The area in which defendants claim to have built
the alleged road is an area where there are large volcanic
rock formations, which would be a physical ~ility for
defendants to build such a road in the manner they described; that once a road is made it is ascertainable for many
years afterward for the reason that the 1xlp soil is disturbed
and the brush will not grow back, leaving it free from brush;
that a person could not even ride a horse through that area,
let alone drive a tractor (Tr. 318, 320, 325). There never
was a road in the area that defendants illustrated on Defendants' Exhibit 11 on that portion of the :road allegedly
built on defendants' Cinder Crater 14 (Tr. 352, proposed
exhibit of surveyor's map, which was not allowed in evidence, Tr. 34, Tr. 343).
There was no evidence of a road on plaintiffs' Drake
No. 1 and Drake No. 8, as described by defendants on Defendants' Exhibit No. 11 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit No.. 29)
which is the area that defendant alleges road W'aS built
clearly discloses that there was no road there at the time
plaintiffs worked this area, and that defendants did not
strip the overburden off the area he testified to, to-wit, the
southeast corner of Drake No. 1. See also the surveyor's
map whioh court refused to allow jury to see or take 1D the
jury room.

Plai.nrtiffs' ExhiJbtt 27 clearly illustrates that it was
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plaintiff who stripped the ove~burden off; the tracks are
those of the plaintiff's tractor in the photograph.
The defendants testified thiat they removed overburden
in the southeast corner of Drake No. 1 for their assessment
work for July 1, 1951, to July 1, 1952 (Tr. 229). Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 29 clearly illustrates that the overburden in
the southwest corner of Drake No. 1 was not stripped as
defendants testified; that at the time plaintiffs commenced
work in 1956 in this area, it was not disturbed by defendants or anyone else. Surveyor's map not admitted illustrates no such work 'as described by defendants in southwest
corner of Drake No. 1.
At a hearing for a preliminary injunction, held May 8,
1956, the defendant Ralph Memmott testified that he knew
the plaintiff Mr. Utley had a claim known as Drake No. 3
at the time he top filed this claim with his claim known as
Black Lava No. 1, which he located April 2, 1956, after
suit commenced. The excuse used hy defendant Ralph
Memmott was that he checked the records to see if he could
locate the claim by .fue records; then if he couldn't he would
top file the claim; that if there was nothing on rthe records
to satisfy him, he would then proceed to file (Pg. 68, 69, 70,
71, Transcript of the Preliminary Hewing). Yet the defendant Ralph Memmott had actual knowledge of this claim
and Where it was looated; and the lower court so found (see
Memorandum Decision Par. 5). It is apparent from the
record that defendants habitually jwnp claims whenever
he is not satisfied with the public record, and with no regard to the actual or physical condition of the claims with
reference to work done or staking; they rely entirely upon
the lack of a surveyed description of record, not by physical inspection of the property. Whenever Mr. Ralph Mem-
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mott sees that someone has located a sizealble deposit of
cinders, he immediately goes to the record to see if irt satisfies him as to its proper location. H the record does not
~atisfy him, he then jumps the claim by filing for record
He admits that the cnly knowledge he has is that of record;
without any regard as to what he knows by a physical inspection. There is no valid claim until it is recorded, in
the opinion of Mr. Memmott (Tr. 275). During the deposition of Mr. Ralph Memmott, taken in April, 1956, he specifically admitted that he did not claim any interest in the
plaintiffs' claim Drake No. 3, as was illustrated on defendants' map then before him at that time (Tr. 270).
At the several pre-trials held on this case, the purpose
was an attempt to simplify the issues and to limit them.
At these pre-trials and depositions it was detennined that
two of the claims, Red Robin A and Drake No. 3, belonging
to plaintiffs, would not be issues for the reason that defendants then had no valid interest in said claims. Since commencement of suit defendants jumped both of these claims,
and brought them right back into issue, and by so doing
succeeded in confusing and increasing the heretofore simplified issues. This certainly defeats the purpose of the
pre-trial procedure.
There was a conflict in the evidence as to which of
the parties performed the annual labor on the claims in
issue, and the places where the work was claimed to have
been done. But the vast preponderance of the evidence
was in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants.
The only witness the defendants produced was one of the
defendants himself, Mr. Ralph Memmott, who is a vitally
interested party. The plainrtiffs produced disinterested witnesses who had no interest in the outcome of the trial, toSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Mt: Mr. A. R. Shelton, a registered surveyor and mining
engineer; Mr. Culbert Robison, a poliee officer for the city
of Fillmore, Utah; Mr. Lowell Peterson, a garage mechanic
and truck driver, together wiith interested parties such as
Mr. George H. Stevens, Mr. VonUtley, and Mrs. Von Utley,
all of whom are parties to this action.
There are a number of discrepancies of defendant's testimony. He relates in the Hearing for a Preliminary Injunction that he shipped cinders from his Cinder Crater No.
14, and has not shipped from Cinder Crater No. 5 (Page
20 of said Transcript). On the deposition of Mr. Ralph
Memmott, he testified that he had nort shipped cinders
from either Cinder Crater No. 13 or No. 14, but did ship
several loads from Cinder Crater No. 5 (Page 12 and 13
of his Deposition).
Mr. Memmott testified at the trial that Mr. Utley was
mining in the area in which defendant had removed the
overburden from (Tr. 236). Plaintiffs' E)ffiibit 29 clearly
shows that the spot which plaintiff has now mined in Drake
No. 1 and No. 8, was not stripped as Mr. Memmott testified it was. This photograph was taken prior to the time
the same area was ~mined by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs submit
that defendant Mr. Ralph Memmott is guilty of perjuring
his testimony before this Court on these matters, and should
not be allowed to prevail on any issues by reason of the
said perjury.
In addition to the above perjured testimony, Mr. Ralph
Memmott testified rt;hat on his deposition that his Cinder
Crater claims No. 13 and No. 14 are both contiguous (Page
10, Memmott Deposition). That the record dearly shows
that Mr. Mem~mott did not own the vast majority of the
alleged Cinder Crater No. 13 claim, forr the reason that it
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had always belonged to another party, and the defendants'
Cinder Crater claims No. 13 and No. 14 have never been
contiguous (Tr. 263, 264).
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I

THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING DEFEND~S TO AMEND THEm SECOND AMENDED ANS-

WER AND COUNTERCLAIM SO AS TO BRING BEFORE THE JURY THE ISSUE OF PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM
RED ROBIN A WinCH HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN ADMI'I*I'ED VALID IN PRE-TRIAL; BY REASON OF DEFENDANTS' TOP FILING PLAINTIFFS' RED ROBIN
A AFTER SUIT HAD CO:MMENCED; RIGHrrS TO BE
DETERMINED WERE THE RIGHTS THAT EXISTED
AT TIME SUIT WAS COMMENCED.

POINT II

THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING DEFENDANTS TO AMEND THEIR SEXX>ND AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM TO BRING BEFORE THE
COURT THE ISSUE OF PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM DRAKE
NO. 3 AND DEFENDANTS' CLAIM BLACK LAVA NO.
1 WHICH WAS LOCATED BY DEFENDANTS ON TOP
OF PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM AFTER THE LAW SUIT WAS
COMMENCED AND WHEN DEFENDANTS HAD ACTUAL KNOWLEOOE OF PLAINTIFFS' VALID CLAIM.
POINT

m

THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO AMEND THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER- AND
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PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT TO PUT BEFORE THE COURT AND JURY THE ISSUE OF THE
PHYSICAL LOCATION OF THE BLACK DRAGON NO.
5 MINING CLAIM; THAT IT WAS IN FORCE AND EFFECT AT THE TIME DEFENDANTS LOCATED THEIR
CINDER CRATER NO. 14 CLAIM; THAT CINDER CRATER NO. 14 WAS THEREFORE INVALID AT THE
TIME PLAINTIFFS LOCATED THEIR DRAKE NO.
1 AND NO.8. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
MAKE A FINDING OF FACT AS TO THE PHYSICAL LOCATION OF BLACK DRAGON NO. 5 AND
THAT THE UNCONTROVERTED EWDENCE WAS TO
THE EFFECr THAT BLACK DRAGON NO.5 WAS THE
SAME PHYSICAL LOCATION OF CINDER CRATER
NO. 14; THAT PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM DRAKE NO. 1 AND
NO. 8 WERE VALID BECAUSE OF THE INVALIDITY
OF CINDER CRATER NO. 14.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO INSTRUCT JURY UPON TilE UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE THIAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT LABOR PERFOR!MED ON PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM RED ROBIN A
DURING THE SPRING OF 1956, PRIOR TO THE LOCATION OF DEFENDANTS' CLAIM RED HILL NO. 1.
POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW
INTO EVIDENCE AS AN EXHIBIT THE SURVEYOR'S
MAP MADE BY MR. A. R. SHELTON, ll..LUSTRATING
THE CLAIMS IN ISSUE AND THE WORKINGS AND
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IMPROVEMENTS ON THE SAME CLAIMS AS OF THE
DATE OF THE SURVEY. THE COURT ERRED BY UNDUE INTERFERENCE WITHJ THE DIRECT EXAMINATION OF MR. A. R. SHELTON WHICH DISCREDITED
THE WITNESS IN THE EYES OF THE JURY.
POINT VI
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT BLACK
DRAGON CLAIM NO.6 WAS INVALID AT THE TIME

DEFENDANTS LOCATED THEIR CLAIM CINDER
CRATER NO. 14 BY REASON OF THE FAILURE OF
THE OWNERS OF SAID BLACK DRAGON NO. 6 TO
FILE AN AFFIDAVIT OF LABOR OR A NOTICE OF
INTENTION TO HOLD FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR
ENDING JULY 1, 1947, OR BETWEEN JULY 1, 1947,
AND JULY 23, 1947, THE DATE OF THE LOCATION
OF CINDER CRATER NO. 14 BY DEFENDANTS.
POINT VII
THE COURT IMPROPERLY REFUSED PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR EITHER THE COURT OR THE
JURY TO VIEW THE PREMISES EITHER AS TO ALL
THE CLAIMS IN DISPUTE OR AS TO CINDER CRATER NO. 13, NO. 14, DRAKE NO. 1 AND NO. 8.
POINT VITI
DEFENDANTS WILFULLY MISREPRESENTED
MATERIAL FACTS RELATING TO ASSESSMENT
WORK ON THE CLAIMS CINDER CRATER NO. 13
AND NO. 14; THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY UPON THE PREPONDERANCE
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OF THE EVIDENCE IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS ON
THE ISSUES OF THE CLAIMS RED ROBIN A, RED
ROBIN, DRAKE NO. 1 AND DRAKE NO. 8.

THE ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING DEFENDANTS TO AMEND THEIR SEOOND AMENDED ANS-

WER AND COUNTERCLAIM SO AS TO BRING BEFORE THE JURY THE ISSUE OF PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM
RED ROBIN A WHICH HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN ADMITTED VALID IN PRE-TRIAL; BY REASON OF DEFENDANTS' TOP FILING PLAINTIFFS' RED ROBIN
A AFTER SUIT HAD COMMENCED; RIGHTS TO BE
DETERMINED WERE THE RIGHTS THAT EXISTED
AT TIME SUIT WAS COMMENCED.
One of the main functions of a Pr~ Trial is to determine
the issues of the case and to limit them as far as possible.
'Dhe defendants conceded to plaintiffs at the first pr~ trial
on this case that their old Cinder Crater No. 5, which was
in direct conflict with plaintiffs' Red Robin A and Red Ro-bin, was invalid for the reason that when Cinder Crater
No. 5 was located, there was a valid claim in force and effect, namely, Black Dragon No. 4 (Defendants' Exhibit
No. 58).
'f.here must be an end to the issues of a case at one
time or another, and the issues should be determined as of
the date of the filing of the lawsuit and the commencement
of the action as between the parties: to said action. In
Healy vs. Rupp, 86 P. 1015, the Colorado Court ruled that
in application for a patent to a mining dai,m, "the rights of
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an adverse ·claimant to a mining location are limited to those
existing at the time of the- filing of his adverse (claim) so
that he is not entitled to urge a subsequent discovery for
the purpose of preventing the issuance of a patent to the
applicant." On page 1017, the Colorado Court states:
"if he had no claim art: the time of filing the adverse, he
will not be heard to assert right to premises in dispute
by virtue of one brought into existence thereafter."

78-40-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is as follows:

"TerminaJtion of title pending action If plaintiff
shows right to recover at time the action was commenced, but it appears that his right has terminated
during pendency of action, the verdict and judgment
must be according to the fact, and plaintiff may recover damages for withholding the property."
It is clear that the Utah Legislature intended that the
status quo be maintained by parties to an action during the
pendency of a quiet title action. Certainly if this were not
the case, there might not be an end to the oontroversy between the parties.
7 4 C. J. S. 145. Quiet Title No. 95.
"The decree must be confined to a determination
and adjustment of existing rights in particular property in controversy."
In Alwnan vs. Hoofer (Wash.) 1905, 79 P. 953, the
court holds as follows:

"Where, immediately after a judgment in an action to recover possession of certain mining claims,
finding that neither of the parties had any possessory
rights in the claims in question, plaintiffs in that action relocated the claims, and thereafter did the reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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quired assessment work thereon, finding that such relocations were made on WlOCCUpied public land, as required by law, was proper."
The rights existing at the time of the commencement
of the action are those thart: are determinative as between
tJhe parties. There was certainly lack of good faith on the
part of defendants to cloud the issues and expand them
after pre-trial. The uncontroverted testimony was thalt
plaintiffs were not only doing their assessment work, (minimum of $112.00 for Red Robin A) , but that they were mining the property. Pursuant to the granting of an injunction to defendants prohibiting plaintiffs from working the
claim Red Robin A, plaintiffs discontinued working this
claim and moved onto their Red Robin claim. Certainly
defendants are estopped from jumping plaintiffs' claim
under these circumstances.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING DEFENDANTS TO AMEND THEIR SECOND AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM TO BRING BEFORE THE
COURT THE ISSUE OF PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM DRAKE
NO.3 AND iDEFENDANTS' CLAIM BLACK LAVA NO.
1 WHICH WAS LOCATED BY DEFENDANTS ON TOP
OF PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM AFfER THE LAW SUIT WAS
COMMENCED AND WHEN DEFENDANTS HAD ACTUAL KNOWLEOOE OF PLAINTIFFS' VALID CLAIM.
Although the jury and the court righ1fully awarded
Drake No. 3 to the plaintiffs, it was error for the court to
even allow the issue to come before the court during the
trial of :the case. The basis for the defendant's claim jump-
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ing was that he claimed he did not know the location of
plaintiffs' claim Drake No. 3 when it was not recorded in
county records in legal subdivisions. The court found
that defendant had actual knowledge of Drake No. 3, its
surveyed description by legal subdivisions prior to the time
that defendant filed Black Lava No.1. In fact, Mr. Ralph
Memmott~ defendant, is guilty of perjury on this point.
He admitted he claimed no interst in Drake No. 3 (Tr.
270, 275).
The error consisted of allowing 'another issue ,before the
jury which did certainly confuse the jury in the lawsuit, in
that a great deal of additional evidence was required to disprove defendants' claim to Drake No. 3, and set up a condition for the jtlry to compromise in awarding the claims
herein; that the jury compromised and gave Drake No. 3
to plaintiffs, when they were entitled to said claim unquestionably.
POINT ill
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO AMEND THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER AND
PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT TO PUT BEFORE THE COURT AND JURY THE ISSUE OF THE
PHYSICAL LOCATION OF THE BLACK DRAGON NO.
5 MINING CLAIM; THAT IT WAS IN FORCE AND EFFECT AT THE TIME DEFENDANTS LOCATED THEIR
CINDER CRATER NO. 14 CLAIM; THAT CINDER CRATER NO. 14 WAS THEREFORE INVALID AT THE
TIME PLAINTIFFS LOCATED THEIR DRAKE NO.
1 AND NO.8. THE COURT ERREID IN FAILING TO
MAKE A FINDING OF FACT AS TO THE PHYSICAL LOCATION OF BLACK DRAGON NO. 5 AND

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
THAT THE UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE WAS TO
THE EFFECf THAT BLACK DRAGON NO.5 WAS THE
SAME PHYSICAL LOCATION OF CINDER CRATER
NO. 14; THAT PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM DRAKE NO. 1 AND
NO. 8 WERE VALID BECAUSE OF THE INVALIDITY
OF CINDER CRATER NO. 14.
The mining daim Black Dragon No.5 was located 1028-37, and was in force and effeot until 7-1-48. The de~cription of said daim was not a surveyed description in a
legal subdivision, hurt a metes and bounds description from
a rock monument (Defendants' Exhibit 38). The physical
location of this daim was vital to determine whether or nort
defendants' Cinder Crater No. 14 was valid, for if Black
Dragon No. 5 was on the same ground as Cinder Crater
No. 14 and Black Dragon No. 5 was in force and effect .at
the time defendants located Cinder Crater No. 14 (7-28-47),
then defendants' Cinder Crater No. 14 is invalid. ~he uncontroverted testimony was to the effect that Black Dragon
No. 5 was located on the same ground that plaintiffs located their Drake No. 1 and Drake No. 8 (Tr. 61, 90, 133,
174, 175) . Mr. Shelton found original Notice of Location
of Black Dragon No. 5 in monument near Southwesrt corner
of Drake No. 1 (Tr. 61, 89, 90).
The court's reason for its refusal to allow plaintiffs'
motion was because the court claimed the defendant had
not had knowledge of this contention by plaintiff, and that
it would be inequitable for defendants to face this issue at
such a late date (Tr. 144). The defendant served Interrogatories upon plaintiffs inquiring into this issue even b~
fore pre- trial. In their Answer to the Interrogatories, plaintiffs expressly placed defendants upon notice of their con-
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tention that Black Dragon No. 5 and Black Dragon No. 6
were one and tlhe same claims. In Answer One, plaintiffs
notified defendants that plaintiffs claimed title to Black
Dragon No. 5 through relocation of the same claim by 1heir
claims Drake No.1 and Drake No.8. (See Answers to Interrogatories). On the same basis, the court allowed defendants to Amend the Pre-Trial Order and Answer and
Counterclaim (Tr. 2, 3) (Tr. 294). It was certainly unjust
and inequitable to allow defendants to amend at such a
time rand then not allow plaintiffs' Motion to Amend the
Complaint and Pre-Trial Order (Tr. 140-143). It was error
for the court to refuse such a vital issue as to the location
of Black Dragon No. 5 and the validity of Cinder Crater
No. 14 at the time of its location.
The court erred in failing to direct the jury as a matter of law that plaintiffs' Drake No.1 and No.8 were valid
for tlle reason thaJt Black Dragon No. 5 was in force and
effect when defendants located Cinder Crater No. 14; that
the uncontroverted evidence was to this effect.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO INSTRUCf JURY UPON THE UNCONTROVERTED EV1JDENCE THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT LABOR PERFOR!MED ON PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM RED ROBIN A
DURING THE SPRING OF 1956, PRIOR TO THE LOCATION OF DEFENDANTS' CLAIM RED HILL NO.1.
The evidence is undisputed that plaintiffs had actual
possession of their claims Red Robin and Red Robin A and
had performed their assessment work for the current year
at the time defendants located their Red Hill No. 1 (Tr. 111,
214, 215, 218, 349). Plaintiffs moved off Red Robin A in
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1956 due to Temporary Injunction obtained by defendants
and granted by the court (Temporary Injunction). Mr.
Ralph Memmott admitted that he saw plaintiffs working
their Red Robin A in May, 1956, and that the value of said
work was worth $32.00 (Tr. 218). Mrs. Utley's uncontradicted evidence was to the effect that a large truck and
driver were hired for two days at the rate of $40.00 per day
to perform assessment work on Red Robin A, and produced
a photograph of the truck used for this purpose (Plaintiffs'
Exhibit 61) (Tr. 349). This made a total valuation of the
assessment work for Red Robin A of $112.00, which is uncontradicted.
Mr. Von Utley testified that he had built a ramp on
Red Robin A during the spring of 1956, in order that he
could load cinders from that claim and ship them (Tr. 106).
That he shipped cinders from Red Robin A, one railroad
car, oo April17, 1956; that he had to rebuild the first ramp
after some unknown person destr~ed it beyond use (Tr.
109,111). That evidently someone did not want 'him to
work the claim and ship cinders from it. Plaintiffs moved
from their mining operation on Red Robin A at the instance
of the ~urt order obtained by the defendants in May, 1956,
prior to the time defendants located their Red Hill No. 1,
and at a time when defendants did not have any valid claim
on the property (Tr. 214, 215). The uncontradicted evidence was to the effect that during the months of February, May and June, 1956, plaintiffs performed a minimtun
of $112.00 work for the annual labor of Red Robin A in
addition to actually mining the claim (Tr. 218, 349) (Plaintilffs' Exhibit 61).
That pursuant to an Injunction from this Court at the
request of the defendants, Mr. Utley moved off Red Robin
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A and went on to Red Robin to continue working and mining (Tr. 113). Under a fact situation such as this, the defendants should certainly be estopped from claiming no
work done on Red Robin A, when they were instrumental
in seeing that plaintiffs moved off from Red Robin A.
The evidence is clear that more than enough work was
done on Red Robin A during the spring of 1956 to comply
with the legal requirements.
POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW
INTO EVIDENCE AS AN EXIITBIT THE SURVEYOR'S
MAP MADE BY MR. A. R. SHELTON, ~LUSTRATING
THE CLAIMS IN ISSUE AND THE WORKINGS AND
IMPROVEMENTS ON THE SAME CLAIMS AS OF THE
DATE OF THE SURVEY. THE COURT ERRED BY UNDUE INTERFERENCE WITH THE DIRECT EXAMINATION OF MR. A. R. SHELTON WHICH DISCREDITED
THE WITNESS IN THE EYES OF THE JURY.
Mr. A. R. Shelton, a registered surveyor and mining
engineer, performed a survey of all of the plaintiffs' claims
at issue before the Court October 13, 1955, and completed
October 16, 1955 (Tr. 26). Mr. Shelton made a survey
map upon which he drew the results of his examination
of the claims at the time the survey was ·made, and recorded
the monuments, diggings, workings, roads, and objects he
observed in his thorough examination of plaintiffs' claims,
and ties the claims into governmental survey in the area.
He produced this map on the witness stand, and it was offered in evidence both at pre-trial and during the trial itself (Tr. 27, 34). The court refused to allow or did not

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21
allow said survey map into evidence upon the reasoning

that it kept reminding the jury of his testimony. Counsel
for plaintiffs offered map into evidence before the contents
of it were disclosed and after a basis of identification a:nd
authenticity was made (Tr. 34). Plaintiffs submit that
such a map is certainly admissible as an exhibit. 3 Nichols
Applied Evidence 2975, No. 7 is as follows:
"Maps are admissible in proper oase to illustrate
the testimony of a witness oT as independent evidence.
A map or chart may be admitted for explanatory use
in connection with the testimony of a witness, although
it would not be admissible as independent evidence."
Certainly this is authority for alloiWing such an authenticated survey map, made by a registered surveyor and
mining engineer, both as an independent exhibit and for
the purpose of illustrating the testimony of the surveyor.
The jury certainly could not possibly remember all of the
measurements and locations of the numerous claims at issue at the trial. They were entitled to have the map to refresh their memory as to his prolonged and detailed testimony. The map expressly vefutes the testimony of defendants as to where defendants performed their alleged
assessment work. It expressly refutes the issue presented
to the jury as to whether or not Mr. Memmott constructed
that ce,rtain road for his assessment work in 1949. It expressly refutes the testimony of Mr. Ralph Memmott that
he performed assessment work in the southwest corner of
Drake No.1 and No.8 during the years 1952 and 1953; the
same identical place that Mr. Von Utley had mined cinders
in 1956. This was prejudicial error to plaintiffs in refusing
said maJp as an exhibit for the use and benefit of the jw-y.
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In the direct examination of Mr. Shelton, the licensed

surveyor and mining engineer, the court interfered with 1Jhe
examination to the point where the jury discredited the
testimony of tJhis very important and disinterested witness.
The court interrupted questions and answers posed, and led
the jury to believe that the court was hostile to the witness
(Tr. 29, lines 19 to 24 of Tr. 30). The court refused to allow the witness to open up tlle map fully for the reason that
the jury might see the map (Tr. 28) . All of this together
did discredit the witness in the eyes of the jury.
POINT VI
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT BLACK
DRAGON CLAIM NO.6 WAS INVALID AT THE TIME
DEFENDANTS LOCATED THEIR CLAIM CINDER
CRATER NO. 14 BY REASON OF THE FAILURE OF
THE OWNERS OF SAID BLACK DRAGON NO. 6 TO
FILE AN AFFIDAVIT OF LABOR OR A NOTICE OF
INTENTION TO HOLD FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR
ENDING JULY 1, 1947, OR BETWEEN JULY 1, 1947,
AND JULY 23, 1947, TilE DATE OF THE LOCATION
OF CINDER CRATER NO. 14 BY DEFENDANTS.
The court did err if ruling as a matter of law that the
ground covered by Black Dragon No. 6 became open to re-

location (Drake No. 1 and Cinder Crater No. 14), for the
reason that neither an affidavit of labor or a Notice of Intention to Hold for the year 1947 was filed in the Recorder's
Office of Millard County, During the war years of the
Second World War, and to and subsequent to the year 1947,
Congress exempted mining claims frQm annual labor.
The apparent intention of Congress was to make those
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mining claims then in force and effect valid, and to prevent
their forfeiture for failure to perform annual labor during
the war years to preserve the ,manpower of the nation and
protect servicemen in the service. The Act directs that a
Notice of Intention to Hold should be filed in the cOlUlty
in which the elaim is located. Plaintiff submits that this
Alct of Congress is nort mandatory.
To make a legislative act mandatory, there must be a
forfeiture provision in the act requiring a forfeiture. This
Congressional Act does not do so. ':Dhere is no forfeiture
provision in the Act, as there is in the Utah Statute requiring annual labor.
"It is a general rule of ccmstruction that where a
legislative provision is accompanied by a penalty for
a failure to observe it, the provision is mandatory."
50 Am. Jur. 49, No. 27.
The Act of suspension provided "that every claimant
of any such mining daim, in order to obtain the benefits of
this act shall file or cause to be filed, in the office where
the location notice or certificate is recorded, on or before
12 o'clock meridian, a notice of his desire to hold said mining claim under this act . . . . ."
The above act does not provide for any penalty of forfeirture in the event the Notice of Intention to Hlo1d is not
filed as is the ,case of the Statute providing for annual labor. As a consequence, this Congressional act is not mandatory, but is permissive.
50 Am. Jur 53, No. 32, states as follows:
"A legislative intention that the word 'shall', is to
be construed as permissive, may appear from the spirit
or purpose of the act, or from the connection in which
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it is used or the relation into which it is put with other
parts of the same statute."
This statutory construction rule is·· suoh that the Congressional Act suspending the work is permissive even
though the word "shall" is used. It was the intention of
Congress to preserve the status quo and to discontinue the
necessity for work on claims. The Utah Supreme Court, in
the case of Murray Hill Min. & Mill. Co. vs. Hanover, 66
P. 762, has ruled that a claim on which the required improvements have been made and labor performed is not
rendered open to re-location by failure to file an affidavit
of labor and improvements as required by the Utah Statute, nor will such failure impair the right of the claimant
to a patent. Every reasonable doubt will be resolved in
favor of the validity of a mining claim as against assertion
of a forfeiture. This same analogy should be carried to the
filing of a Notice of Intention to Hold; that the work was
· not necesary to be performed during the war years, and
the mere failure to file the Notice of Intention to Hold does
not forfeit a daim.
In Cain vs. Addenda Mining Co., 15 ALR 942, the Interior Department of the U. S. A. held the suspension resolution NOT MANDATORY.
In Donoghue v. Tonopah Oriental Min. Co., Nevada, 198
P. 553, 15 ALR 937, held that the failure to file notice of
intention to take advantage of the resolution of Congress
of 10-5-17, suspending assessment work on mining claims
during the war, in the office where location notice was filed
as required by the proviso of the Act, because of uncertainty
as to County line and advice of County Officials that it
should be filed in another county, where it was in fact filed,
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does not render the 'Claim subject to relocation by another
claimant; that where statute is susceptible of two interpr~
tations, that one will be given it which best enmports with
reason and justice; that equity never enforces forfeitures,
nor extends its aid in the assertion of a mere legal right
contrary to clear equity and justice of the case; that there
is no fnrfeiture where there is no fraud or deceit, no intentinn to abandon, good faith and hnnest effort to comply,
and excusable negleet, not attributed to owner.
This case clearly illustrates that the filing of the Notice of Intention to Hold is not mandatory and does not create a forfeiture, Plaintiffs submit; that the above elements
for excusable neglect to file the Notice of Intention to Hold
prevails in the instant ease; that Black Dragon No. 5 and
No. 6 were overlapping claims, and Black Dragon No. 6
included Black Dragon No.5, at least as far as the amendment to Black Dragon Nn. 6 is concerned, which was done
prior to the location of Cinder Crater No. 14 by defendants; that Notice of Intention to Hold Black II)ragon No. 5
was in fact filed which was for both Black Dragon No. 5
and Black Dragon No. 6. Certainly this is one of the e~x
ceptions that the authorities do and should recognize in the
failure of owners to file Notice of Intention to Hold on Black
Dragon No.6.
In the case of Morgan vs. Sorenson, 286 P2d 229, Utah,
1955, this Court discussed the aim of the assessment requirement in that it was to develop the mineral reSOIUrces
and encourage the mining of claims. In the instant case,
it has been the plaintiffs that have been doing the mining
and developing the resources. The plaintiffs have developed and mined their Drake No.1 and No.8 during the five
years they have held the claim, while the defendants have
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not mined or developed their Cinder Crater No. 13 or No.
14 claims in the ten years they have claimed them; the PlU'pose of the law will be upheld by quieting title in the claims
to plaintiffs, because plaintiffs have done and will continue
to mine and develop these resources.
In 15 ALR 942, the case of Royston vs. Miller is cited

as follows:
''The suspension of the provisions of the statute
requiring annual work to be done n~y SUSPENDED TIIE RIGHT OF FORFEITURE. The forfeiture imposed by the statute was for failing to do the
work which the law then required to be done.
"The suspendatory or amendatory act provided
that the work hitherto required need not be done in
[1893], and hence it follows that the right of forfeiture
could not thereafter exist for any act omitted in that
respect during that year. THE ENFORCEMENT OF
A FORFEITURE CANNOT BE HAD WHEN THE
LAW EXCUSES THE PERFORMANCE OF THAT
CONDITION."
The above clearly establishes the fact that these moratorium acts were intended to do away with the forfeiture
provision in the law requiring the forfeiture of claims when
annual work was not done. That the moratoriwn act for
the year 1947 does not provide for a forfeiture of the claims
in the event the Notice of Intention to Hold is not filed;
hence the statute is not mandatory, but permissive and directory. The claim Black Dragon No. 6 was not forfeited
for the reason that a Notice of Intention to Hold was not
filed under its name just prior to the time defendants I~
cated Cinder Crater No. 14. Actually, a Notice of Intention to Hold was filed for Black Dragon No. 5 and No. 6
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to 7-1-48; for the two claims at that time were merged into
one another and the Notice To Hold was filed in the name
of Black Dragon No. 5.
POINT VII
TilE COURT IMPROPERLY REFUSED PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR EITHER THE COURT OR THE
JURY TO VIEW THE PREMISES EITHER AS TO ALL
THE CLAIMS IN DISPUTE OR AS TO CINDER CRATER NO. 13, NO. 14, DRAKE NO. 1 AND NO. 8.
Under Rule 47(j) of the Utah Rules of Civil ProcedUTe,
the jury may be allowed to view the property which is the
subject of litigation when in the opinion of the court it is
proper for the jury to view the premises. Plaintiffs admit
that this is within the discretion of the Court as to whether
or not the jury or the Court should view the premises. In
the case of P. A. Sorenson Co. vs. Denver & R. G. R. Co.,
Utah, 164 P. 1020, the Supreme Court of Utah states that
the purpose of a view of the premises is to enable the jury
to better understand and more fully appreciate the evidence
produced in open court, and is not for the purpose of taking independent evidence. Plainiffs submit that a view in
the instant case would have clarified a number of the issues
before the jury when there were so many claims involved;
that they could have dete,rmined by physical inspection
whether or not the defendants could have ~constructed that
certain road across Cinder Crater No. 14 and No. 13; that
one look at the terrain would have convinced them that it
would be impossible for the defendant to have constructed
such a road in the time he testified he did (1lj2 days) across
impassable terrain even for a horse. The jury was defi-
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nitely confused with the original issues and the additional
issues defendants created during the course of the trial.
A view of the premises for this purpose alone would have
dispelled this one issue alone in favor of plaintiffs and would
have proven beyond any doubt that Mr. Ralph Memmott
had perjured himself before the court, and that the jury
would then have resolved a minimum of one of the Special
Interrogatories submitted to them in favor of the plaintiffs, but which they did not do so, to-wit: Was the road
constructed by defendant and the amount which the road
cost. It would have been impracticable to disprove this
fictitious road any other way, except by testimony and a
view of the premises.
53 Am. Jur. 315, No. 442:
"A view should not be granted unless it appears
to be reasonably certain or the court is satisfied that
it will be some aid to the jury in reaching their verdict, and further, that it is distinctly impracticable
and inefficient to present the material elements to them
by photographs, diagrams, maps, measurements, and
the like."
If the court felt that it was too cumbersome to take
the jury there, the court itself could have viewed the premises quickly and efficiently and determined once and for
all whether Mr. Ralph Memmott had actually constructed
the road he drew in red pencil across Defendants' Exhibit
No. 11.
The defendants objected to such a view, and apparently
they were afraid of the results of such an inspection.
Plaintiffs submit that this was a case in which the court
abused its discretion in refusing to allow a view of the premises.
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POINT VITI
DEFENDANTS WILFULLY MISREPRESENTED
MATERIAL FACTS RELATING TO ASSESSMENT
WORK ON THE CLAIMS CINDER CRATER NO. 13
AND NO. 14; THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCf THE JURY UPON 'fHlE PREPONDERANCE
OF THE EVIDENCE IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS ON
THE ISSUES OF THE CLAIMS RED ROBIN A, RED
ROBIN, DRAKE NO. 1 AND rrJRAKE NO. 8.
The record is replete with intentional discrepancies in
the testimony of Mr. Ralph Memmott. At a hearing for
a preliminary injunction he stated that he had mined and
shipped cinders from his Cinder Crater No. 14, and that he
has not mined and shlpped cinders from Cinder Crater No.
5 (Page 20 of that transcript). On his deposition, Mr. Memmott testified that he had not shipped cinders from either
Cinder Crater No. 13 or No. 14, but did ship from Cinder
Crater No. 5 (Bages 12, 13 of deposition).
Mr. Memmott testified at the trial that Mr. Utley
was mining in the spot on Drake No. 1 ·and No. 8, in the
southwest comer, where defendant had performed some
of his assessment work in 1952 and 1953, removing overburden (Tr. 236). Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 29 clearly shows
that the spot which plaintiff has now mined there was not
stripped by defendant as he described it, or at all, by anyone prior to the time that plaintiffs stripped the overburden
off and mined it. This photograph was taken prior to the
time the same area was mined by plaintiffs. Mr. Shelton's
survey map, which was offered but not admitted in evidence, clearly illustrates that there was no overbUTden
stripped from this area in 1955 when he surveyed the claims
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and made the map; Mr. Shelton so testified. Mr. Lowell
Peterson, the truck driver, testified that the same spot had
not been stripped as described by Mr. Memmott at a time
when Mr. Peterson drove there to haul some cinders away
from those claims for Mr. Utley.
The red line on defendants' Exhibit 11, indicating a
road Mr. Memmott allegedly built in 1949, is not disclosed
on the survey map of Mr. Shelton (Tr. 34, 343). Mr. Lowell Peterson and Mr. Cul·bert Robison, the policeman, both
testified that there was no such road on Drake No. 8 and
that it would be physically impossible to build such a road
in that area and in the time defendant alleged he built it
(Tr. 318, 320, 325, 352). A view of the premises would
have conclusively proved the road to be fictitious in the
area it was drawn and the time and manner it was alleg-edly built.
Mr. Memmott testified that he did not know the whereabouts or the existence of Drake No. 3 at the time he jumped
this claim and filed his Black Lava No. 1 claim after this
lawsuit had been commenced. The court found in its Judgment and Findings of Fact and Law that Mr. Memmott had
actual knowledge of plaintiffs' Drake No. 3, both as to its
location and existence.
Mr. Memmott testified on his deposition that his Cinder Crater claims No. 13 and No. 14 were both contiguous
(Page 10, Memmott Deposition). The record clearly shows
that Mr. Memmott did not own the vast majority of the alleged Cinder Crater No. 13 for the reason that it had always belonged to another party (Tr. 263, 264).
It is clear at this point that Mr. Ralph Memmott has
wilfully misrepresented the aJbove facts. That, in effect,
he has purjured himself on the above points. He should

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

31
not be allowed to prevail on any issues based upon his misrepresented evidence.
There is a conflict in the evidence as to which of the
parties performed the annual labor on claims in issue
and the places where the work was claimed to have been
done. But the vast preponderance of the evidence is in
favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants. The
only witness the defendants produced was one of the defendants himself, Mr. Ralph Memmott, who is a vitally interested party. The plaintiffs produced disinterested witnesses who had no interest in the outcome of the trial, .towit: Mr. A. R. Shelton, a registered surveyor and mining
engineer; Mr. Culbert Robison, a police officer for the city
of Fillmore, Utah; Mr. Lowell Peterson, a garage mechanic
and truck driver, together with interested parties such as
Mr. George H. Stevens, Mr. and Mrs. Von Utley, all of whom
are parties to this action.
In view of this vast preponderance of evidence in favor
of the plaint:iftis, the court should have pointed out and instructed the jury such a preponderance of the evidence.
By reason of the intentional clouding and multiplying of the
issues on the part of the defendant after suit was commenced, and the above mentionad wilful misrepresentations ·made by defendant, Mr. Ralph Memmott, the issues on
appeal should now be resolved in favor of the plaintiff as
to the plaintiffs' claims Red Robin A, Red Robin, Drake
No. 1 and No. 8.
CONCLUSION

The court erred in allowing defendants to top file plaintiffs' Red Robin A ·and Drake No. 3 elaims after suit was
commenced, to amend the pre-trial order and the pleading
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just prior to trial, and thus increase the already numerous
issues before the court, which thoroughly confused the
jury. 'Jibe parties' rights should have been determined as
they existed at the time of the eommencenient of the suit
as between the parties. Defendants top filed plaintiffs'
Drake No. 3 after suit commenced and pending trial and
with full and actual knowledge of the existence and locartion
of the said claim of plaintiffs.
The court erred in refusing plaintiffs' motion to include as an issue of the physical location of Black Dragon
No. 5 claim which bore directly on the validity of defendants' claim Cinder Crater No. 14. The evidence conclusively proved that Black Dragon No. 5 and plaintiffs' Drake
No. 1 were one and the same location; that in fact plaintiffs used the original monument of Black Dragon No. 5
in the location of Drake No. 1. That as a result, defendants' Cinder Crater No. 14 was invalid at the time plaintiffs located Drake No.1, for the reason that Black Dragon
No.5 was in force and effect at the time C"mder Crater No.
14 was located.
The court erred in failing to instruct the jury as to the
sufficiency of the labor performed by plaintiffs on Red
Robin A during the spring of 1956, prior to the location of
defendants' Red Hill No. 1, after commencement of the
suit. That the uncontroverted evidence was to the effect
that a minimum of $112.00 was done in spring of 1956 and
in addition a mining operation on said claim; that plaintiffs discontinued further mining operations on Red Robin
A just immediately prior to the location of defendants' Red
Hill No. 1 by reason of an injunction to prevent plaintiffs
from mining said Red Robin A and obtained by defendants.
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Defendants are estopped from asserting their Red Hill No.

1.
The court erred in failing and refusing to allow Mr.
Shelton's survey map into evidence to illustrate the physical condition of the daims in issue at the time survey was
made. That said map refutes much of the testimony of
defendants concerning assessment work allegedly performed
by defendants. That said map would aid jury in determining the issues and clarify some of the testimony. That said
map is certainly admisstble in evidence.
The 'COurt erred in ruling that it is necessary under the
Congressional Moratorium Act for the year 1947 that it
is necessary to file Notice of Intention to Hold in order to
prevent a forfeiture of the claim when no work is done. The
Act is not mandatory for the reason that it provides for
no forfeiture. The A:ct relieved the forfeiture provision for
failure to do assessment work annually. The courts abhor
a forfeiture. A Notice of Iintention to Hold was filed for
Black Dragon No. 5, which was part of the amended Black
Dragon No.6 for the time at issue, when defendants located Cinder Crater No. 14. That the Notice of Intention to
Hold for Black Dragon No. 5 was good for Black Dragon
No.6.
The court abused its discretion in failing to allow a
view of the premises to the jury or the court itself certainly
as to the issue presented to the jury as to the existence of
a fictitious road built by defendants across Cinder Crater
No. 13 and No. 14 in 1949. The view would certainly have
clarified the existence or non-existence of the road, and simplified the issues in this respect.
The court erred in failing to instruct the jury as to the
vast preponderance of the evidence in favor of the plain-
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tiffs on the issues by reason of the strong testimony of
many disinterested witnesses.
the defendants wilfully misrepresented material facts
as to assessment work on their claims Cinder Crater No.
13 and No. 14. The record conclusively proves that Mr.
Ralph Memmott has contradicted himself on numerous occasions and wilfully misrepresented that he did not know
of the existence or whereabouts of plaintiffs' claim Drake
No. 3, when in fact Mr. Memmott had actual knowledge
of its whereabouts and existence. The voice of justice and
equity cries out that such a perjured testimony should not
be allowed to prevail in a Court of Justice.
Respectfully submitted,
THOMAS S. TAYLOR,

Attorney for Plaintiffs
and Appellants,
55 East Center St.,
Provo, Utah
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